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COMMENTS
SAGGING SUPPORT STATUTE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA UNIFORM
RECIPROCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT
The enforcement of duties of support' became a nationwide problem in
the United States in the early part of the twentieth century as the increase
in interstate travel facilitated the widespread evasion of support decrees by
fleeing obligors.2 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
1. Duties of support are undergoing changes in scope and application to the various
members of a household. At common law, only fathers were obligated to support legitimate,
biological children. Statutes now impose that obligation on both the father and mother and
may impose a duty to support adopted or illegitimate children as well. More frequently,
courts are imposing upon women the duty of spousal support pursuant to separation or
divorce. Similarly, children too may bear a duty to support indigent or infirm parents. Fi-
nally, support obligations may run between brothers, sisters, or grandchildren, as recognized
duties of support proliferate. See Brockelbank, The Problem of Family Support. A New
Uniform Act Offers a Solution, 37 A.B.A.J. 93 (1951); Note, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act, 13 STAN. L. REV. 901, 904 n.17 (1961).
2. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note to URESA, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 171 (1950) [hereinafter cited
as HANDBOOK (1950)], reprinted in 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 751 (1979). The twenti-
eth century upheaval in American population mobility was precipitated in part by the auto-
mobile, two world wars, and increased availabilty of education. Ease in interstate
movement resulted in an unprecedented incidence of social migration. As restraints on the
interstate movement of defaulting support obligors were removed, the numbers of aban-
doned support obligees increased. Most state courts, however, were unwilling to honor sup-
port duties originating in other jurisdictions. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
458 (1934) (no state will directly enforce a duty to support created by the laws of another
state). The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws addressed this problem in the original
draft of their uniform act:
Each state will enforce its law as before so long as the husband remains in the
state, and the new act is meant to improve enforcement where the parties are in
different states.
The only extension of the duties of support is the principle stated in Section 4
that the duty shall bind the obligor regardless of the presence of the obligee. The
purpose here is to overcome the rule in some states that the duty of support runs
only in favor of obligees within the state, and to overcome the indifference of many
states which would refuse or neglect to enforce support in favor of out-of-state
dependents on the theory often only tacitly admitted, that one state has no interest
in helping another state rid itself of the burden of supporting destitute families.
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State Laws3 responded by drafting the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act (URESA),4 designed to provide a comparatively simple
process for enforcing support awards when the person owing the duty of
support5 left the state where the person owed the duty of support 6 was
domiciled. Although the effort to develop an interstate enforcement mech-
anism began in 1909,' it was not until 1950 that a viable draft was
presented to state legislatures.' Prior to URESA, an obligee domiciled in
state A, who sought enforcement of a support order against an obligor
domiciled in state B, was required by common law to travel to state B and
HANDBOOK (1950), supra at 172. See generally Note, supra note 1, at 901 n.2.
3. See HANDBOOK (1950), supra note 2. An excellent exposition of the history of the
uniform support law appears in Brockelbank, supra note 1, at 93.
4. Four versions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act have been
drafted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1950, 1952, 1958, and the Revised
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (1968)) [hereinafter cited as URESA 1950,
URESA 1952, URESA 1958, and RURESA 1968]. The present District of Columbia
URESA is essentially the same as URESA 1952, which is set out in the HANDBOOK OF'THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 175-80 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK (1952)].
5. Basic terms for use in URESA proceedings include:
a) obligee, the person to whom the duty of support is owed;
b) obligor, the person who owes the duty of support;
c) initiating state, forum where the obligee files a support petition;
d) responding state, forum that has jurisdiction over the obligor. See Fox, The Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement ofSupport Act, 12 FAM. L.Q. 113, 114 (1978); Exparte Floyd, 43
Cal. 2d 379, 273 P.2d 820 (1954) (en banc). The District of Columbia URESA avoids em-
ploying the terms obligor and obligee in favor of plaintiff and defendant because this termi-
nology is clearer. S. REP. No. 462, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 4621. This comment will use obligee andplaintiff and obligor and defendant interchange-
ably.
6. Prior to URESA, a fleeing obligor who established domicile in a foreign jurisdiction
was generally immune from suit, since a destitute obligee almost certainly lacked the re-
sources to bring a support action in the obligor's forum. See generally Brockelbank, supra
note 1, at 94; Comment, Louisiana Adopts Un!form Laws.- The Revised Unform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act of 1968, 24 Loy. L. REV. 53, 53-54 (1978); Note, Uniform Recip-
rocal Enforcement of Support Act. A CriticalAnalysis of lts Current and Future Status, 17 U.
PITT. L. REV. 261, 263 (1956).
7. A 1909 study of nonsupport by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
culminated in the Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act in 1910. Adopted in 24jurisdic-
tions, the 1910 Act provided for support enforcement only through criminal penalties and
had no provision for interstate enforcement. See HANDBOOK (1950), supra note 2, at 171.
8. By 1950, one state legislature had already taken action on the problem of reciprocal
support enforcement. In 1949, New York State adopted the Uniform Support of Depen-
dents Act (USDA). N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §§ 30-43 (McKinney 1977). Ten states subse-
quently adopted variations of the USDA, although these statutes were soon replaced with
URESA. USDA remains in effect in New York largely because it is compatible with pre-
vailing URESA statutes. See Brockelbank, supra note 1, at 95; Note, supra note 1, at 901
n. 1.
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file suit there to enforce the order.9 The practical effect was that many
abandoned obligees turned to their domiciliary government (state A) for
support.' URESA was intended to ameliorate the harsh impact of this
common law rule by permitting enforcement in state B of support awards
entered in state A without requiring the obligee to leave home." Within
seven years, the Act was adopted by all jurisdictions, including the District
of Columbia. 2
The District of Columbia URESA has remained essentially the same as
the 1952 Act, despite several amendments to the model act made by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1958 and again in 1968.'" In its
9. The obligee was required to travel to the obligor's domicile so that personal jurisdic-
tion could be asserted against the obligor. The difficulty of obtaining personal jurisdiction
often precluded an indigent obligee from obtaining any recourse against a defaulting obli-
gor. Furthermore, should an obligee have pursued a defaulting party to a foreign jurisdic-
tion, the obligor could have simply traveled to a new forum to escape the suit.
10. The financial burden shouldered by abandoned obligees' states was growing signifi-
cantly when the first versions of URESA were passed. The states' aggregate support ex-
penses for 900,000 abandoned obligees in 1950 was placed at $205 million by the Executive
Director and Chief Counsel of the National Desertion Bureau. See Brockelbank, supra note
1, at 95. Interestingly, there are no figures that indicate the states in which expenses have
declined with the adoption of URESA statutes. Cf Comment, Nonsupport Actions and the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act [sic], 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 519, 519 (1955)
(in 1953, approximately $605 million was spent on public assistance to 564,000 families
throughout the United States).
11. By permitting interstate enforcement of duties of support, URESA accommodates
phenomena that have transformed the nature of American society, notably, increased mobil-
ity by virtue of technological advances and the creation of broad social welfare programs. It
can be postulated that the availability of public assistance produces an atmosphere condu-
cive to the obligor's flight since the state stands ready to act as a substitute provider.
URESA, by permitting interstate enforcement of support, is intended to ease the resultant
financial burden on the obligee's state governments. Incidentally, however, URESA has
affected the functioning of states as independent entities. Under prior law, modifiable sup-
port orders for past due judgments were not afforded full faith and credit. See Sistare v.
Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1910) (past due judgments in a state are not within the full faith
and credit clause when they are modifiable because the right has not vested). Since most
jurisdictions hold that URESA awards are modifiable in both the initiating and responding
states, these support awards would not, absent URESA, be enforceable because they would
not be entitled to full faith and credit. Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901) (future alimony
award granted by New Jersey court held modifiable and therefore not entitled to full faith
and credit in New York). Thus, the Act has altered the freedom of states to disregard deci-
sions involving support made outside their jurisdictional boundaries. See Fox, supra note 5,
at 130.
12. The URESA for the District of Columbia is set out at D.C. CODE §§ 30-301 to 30-
324 (1973) (passed by Congress as Act of July 10, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-94, 71 Stat. 285
(1957)).
13. The only major modifications concern the name changes made under the District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, D.C. CODE §§ 11-101 to 11-
2504 (1973).
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present form, the District of Columbia URESA lacks two significant pro-
cedural provisions common to most state URESAs. 14 First, it does not
include procedures for ordering payment of arrearages in support ac-
tions.' 5 Thus, District-resident obligors who default may escape their duty
of support from the date payments cease until a District of Columbia court
orders resumption, because missed payments cannot be recovered under
present District of Columbia law. Second, the District of Columbia
URESA ambiguously permits different choices of substantive law when a
minor obligee, seeking support until his age of majority, sues an obligor
domiciled in the District. 16 Since the age of majority among the states may
vary from eighteen to twenty-one years,' 7 up to three years of support pay-
ments may be ordered or terminated depending upon the choice of law
made by the presiding District of Columbia Superior Court judge. To
date, the cases considering this issue have yielded inconsistent results: one
judge has ordered payments to age twenty-one for an obligee recognized in
his domicile as an adult at age eighteen; two other judges have terminated
the obligee's support at age eighteen under the same circumstances.' 8
Consequently, the ambiguity in the District of Columbia URESA choice
of law provision may result in differing support burdens for identically
situated obligors present in the District of Columbia who have minor chil-
dren residing outside the District.
Finally, the District of Columbia URESA essentially embodies the uni-
form act as drafted in 1952,'9 and therefore does not reflect significant
changes in the model act that have been made by the National Conference.
Among these changes are amendments to permit recovery of arrearages
14. The amended model act (RURESA 1968) has been adopted by half the states and is
set out at 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 647 (1979), and HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 226 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as HANDBOOK (1968)]. URESA 1958 is set out at 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 758
(1979), and HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 243 (1958) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK (1958)].
15. Arrearages are the past support payments that the obligor has missed. The difficulty
in locating a fleeing obligor may permit substantial amounts of time to elapse before a
URESA suit can be brought. The result can be significant accumulations of unpaid support
for which no statutory remedy is available under the District of Columbia URESA.
16. The age of majority in the District of Columbia remains 21 for child support, but is
otherwise 18. Barnett v. Barnett, 243 A.2d 51, 53 (D.C. 1968).
17. At least one jurisdiction has set 17 as the age of majority, unless the person is unable
to maintain himself and is therefore likely to need public support. IOWA CODE § 252A.2(3)
(1971).
18. See notes 94-99 and accompanying text infra.
19. When Congress enacted the URESA for the District, some changes were made to
ensure government recovery of public funds expended for support. See notes 36-38 and
accompanying text infra.
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and provide an unambiguous choice of substantive law, thereby facilitat-
ing URESA application, correcting unfairness in URESA proceedings,
and clarifying the drafters' intent. The most important of these amend-
ments, however, may be the registration system provision that permits the
responding state to treat the foreign obligee's support petition as if issued
in the responding state.2" Taken together, these defects and omissions rep-
resent procedural gaps that undermine the District of Columbia URESA's
effectiveness as a mechanism for the interstate enforcement of support
awards.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA URESA
A. Duties of Support
In 1957, the District of Columbia became the last jurisdiction in the na-
tion to enact URESA.2 1 As adopted, the District's Act conforms to all
other state URESAs in providing for broad interpretation of the basic
term duty ofsupport.22 This term of art is intended to encompass all statu-
tory and common law support duties, thereby preserving judicial discre-
tion to find and enforce duties of support.23 Accordingly, any statutory or
common law duties of support, including those arising from support de-
crees in divorce or separation proceedings, are enforceable under the
Act.
24
Once a duty of support has been found, most courts, including those in
the District of Columbia, continue to impose it - even when wrongdoing
20. The registration process is discussed at notes 58-64 and accompanying text infra.
21. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note to URESA, HANDBOOK (1958), reprinted in 9A
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 748 (1979). "[T]he District is the only jurisdiction in the
United States in which the act is not in force .... 103 CONG. REC. 10,131 (1957) (remarks
of Rep. McMillan prior to House passage of the Act). As the only non-URESA jurisdiction
in the nation, the District had obtained some notoriety as an attractive residence for obligors
fleeing from support obligations incurred elsewhere. S. REP. No. 462, supra note 5, at 3
(District labeled "haven for runaway fathers").
22. The definitional section of the District of Columbia URESA is D.C. CODE § 30-302
(1973). The duty of support is defined in § 30-302(e).
23. URESA duties of support should always be interpreted as broadly as possible.
"The thrust of the statutory definition of 'duty of support' is plainly intended to encompass
any possible support duty created for an obligee in a particular state. Fox, supra note
5, at 116.
24. See D.C. CODE § 30-302(e)(1) (1973). See also Mehrstein v. Mehrstein, 245 Cal.
App. 2d 646, 54 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1966) (support under URESA includes necessaries during
marriage, separate maintenance during legal separation, and alimony or child support after
divorce); Commonwealth ex rel Shaffer v. Shaffer, 175 Pa. Super. Ct. 100, 103 A.2d 430
(1954) (husband's obligation to support wife is imposed as an incident of marital status);
Yetter v. Commeau, 84 Wash. 2d 155, 524 P.2d 901 (1974) (en banc) (duty to support child
born out of wedlock is imposed by law).
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by other parties would seem to militate against the imposition of a contin-
uing duty. For example, in Edmonds v. Edmonds, a father's duty to pro-
vide reasonable support survived the misconduct of the mother, who
voluntarily removed herself and her children from the family's home.
And, in Brit v. Britt, 26 the District of Columbia Municipal Court of Ap-
peals 27 held that the support duty of a father was similarly unaffected by
the wife's denial of visitation rights.28 The courts in the District, and most
state courts in the United States, impose the duty of child support, despite
a spouse's denial of visitation rights, on the theory that a spouse's acts
should not deprive the children of proper support.29 The rule is not uni-
form, however, as some jurisdictions condition the continuance of support
25. 146 A.2d 774 (D.C. 1958). The Edmonds court found a legal obligation of a father
to support his children, rejecting a contention that the support duty was only a moral obliga-
tion. Id at 775. Moreover, the District of Columbia had generally held that a husband's
duty to support his children is not abrogated by his wife's misconduct. See, e.g., Carey v.
Carey, 8 App. D.C. 528, 531 (1896).
Only one District of Columbia court has held termination of child support a legitimate
remedy for a wife's misconduct. In Adams v. Adams, 184 A.2d 213 (D.C. 1962), the
wife/mother promised the court she would return from Europe with her children within a
prescribed time to permit continued visitation by her husband, a District resident. With that
assurance, the court permitted her to leave the country. Instead of returning, she and her
children became permanent residents of Morocco. The court upheld termination of child
support payments on the grounds that the mother had "trifled" with the court. Id at 214.
Although Adams seemed to modify the Edmonds rule against penalizing children for the
acts of their parents, Adams has since been limited to its circumstances by Norton v. Norton,
298 A.2d 514 (D.C. 1972). There, the defendant father, a District resident, was ordered to
pay URESA support for his children who had been taken to California by their mother.
Although the mother was found to have acted in contempt of court by removing the children
from the District, the Adams rationale was not applied and support payments were not ter-
minated.
26. 153 A.2d 644 (D.C. 1959).
27. The Municipal Court of Appeals and the District of Columbia Court of General
Sessions became, respectively, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the District of
Columbia Superior Court under the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Pro-
cedure Act of 1970. D.C. CODE §§ 11-101 to 11-2504 (1973).
28. 153 A.2d at 646. The Brit court in a URESA action also determined that it had the
power to award the wife's attorney's fees, even though the district court had, in a separate
action, dismissed the wife's claim for support because she had denied her husband visitation
rights. Id at 647. The Brit court refused to accept the district court's dismissal, citing
changed circumstances in that the wife had permitted resumption of visitation, and also
citing, and refusing to void, the Edmonds rule. Id at 646.
29. See Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. App. 3d 457, 137 Cal Rptr. 348 (1977) (child
support not terminable merely because one parent violates a court order); Vecellio v. Vecel-
lio, 313 So. 2d 61 (Fla. App. 1975) (father's remedy for denial of visitation is to return to
initiating state where mother and children reside and adjudicate the matter); Pifer v. Pifer,
31 N.C. App. 486, 229 S.E.2d 700 (1976) (judge lacks jurisdiction to condition support pay-
ments on visitation privilege and has no authority to permit discontinuance of support pay-
ments on finding violation of visitation privileges).
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upon proper visitation rights.3"
In addition to a general duty of support, the District of Columbia
URESA creates a duty of support for illegitimate children, a provision
making the District statute distinct from those of other states. 3' In reality,
however, the duty of support for illegitimate children has been
subordinated to the support entitlement of legitimate children. In Mitchell
v. Mitchell,32 and Jefferson v. Jefferson,3 3 for example, the District of Co-
lumbia Municipal Court of Appeals interpreted the Act to give support
preference to legitimate children when their rights conflict with the rights
of illegitimate children. 34 Thus, when one obligor owes a duty of support
to both legitimate and illegitimate children, the legitimate children will
probably receive a greater share of the support payments. 35
Another provision unique to the District's Act includes reimbursement
30. See generally State ex rel. Arvayo v. Guerrero, 21 Ariz. App. 173, 517 P.2d 526
(1973) (denial of visitation rights by mother justifies suspending child support payments);
Chandler v. Chandler, 109 N.H. 477, 256 A.2d 157, 158-59 (1969) (absence of right to visita-
tion does not bar right of support which continues and may be enforced under URESA, but
court may reduce support order until visitation rights are respected); Harvey v. Harvey, 58
Misc. 2d 917, 297 N.Y.S.2d 320, 323-24 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (wife would be fined, incarcerated,
and child support terminated unless she agreed to original visitation stipulations).
URESA's drafters intended that child support not be terminated when visitation rights
have been hampered, and that intent is reflected in the Arizona Act. Arizona's URESA
statute reads in pertinent part, "(tihe determination or enforcement of a duty of support
owed to one obligee is unaffected by any interference by another obligee with rights of cus-
tody or visitation granted by a court." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1672 (Supp. 1979).
Nonetheless, the Arvayo court held that the entire duty of support, not just enforcement of
that duty, was terminated by the court's modification of the divorce decree. 21 Ariz. App. at
175, 517 P.2d at 528.
31. D.C. CODE § 30-320 (1973). Originally intended to provide a duty of support for
fathers of illegitimate children, § 320 was amended in 1976 to impose the duty upon mothers
of illegitimate children as well. D.C. CODE § 30-320 (Supp. 1978). Even where they are not
expressly provided for in URESA statutes, other jurisdictions have enforced duties to sup-
port illegitimate children. See Yetter v. Commeau, 84 Wash. 2d 155, 159, 524 P.2d 901
(1974) (court would recognize a legal duty to support illegitimate children).
32. 257 A.2d 496 (D.C. 1969), afjd, 445 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33. 192 A.2d 813 (D.C. 1963).
34. The question of preference toward legitimate children in support cases first arose in
the District in Miner v. Miner, 192 A.2d 811 (D.C. 1963). Noting that the District of Colum-
bia URESA provided a duty of support for illegitimate children, the Miner court adopted
the rationale of McCarthy v. McCarthy, 197 Misc. 596, 94 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803 (Fan. Ct.
1950), that gave preference to legitimate children because they were the result of the marital
relationship and were, therefore, sanctioned by moral considerations. This morality-based
preference has not been challenged since its adoption in Miner.
35. Rights of illegitimates have enjoyed increasing protection. See Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535 (1973) (Texas law that granted right of support to legitimate children but denied
right of support to illegitimate children violative of equal protection clause); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (Louisiana law denying workmen's compensation ben-
efits to illegitimate children violative of equal protection); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
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of political subdivisions and agencies for the amounts expended in the care
of abandoned obligees as a duty of support.36 This provision was absent
from the definition of duty of support as included in the 1950, 1952, 1958,
and 1968 versions of URESA 7 Congress, in passing the URESA statute
for the District, intended the federal government's support payments to
abandoned obligees in the District to be recoverable, both for financial and
political reasons. This provision, therefore, probably made the District of
Columbia URESA more palatable to Congress by minimizing the
financial burdens on the federal government.38
B. Civil Enforcement
When the District of Columbia is the initiating state in a URESA pro-
ceeding - when the abandoned obligee is a District resident - the obligee
commences the action by filing a complaint 39 setting forth certain pertinent
facts.' 0 After assessing the plaintiff-obligee's 4 petition, the District of Co-
(1972) (father of illegitimate children entitled to hearing before children declared wards of
state on death of mother).
36. D.C. CODE § 30-302(e)(2) (1973). The District of Columbia URESA is the only
URESA statute to so provide.
37. A state reimbursement provision is included in URESA § 8 (1950), URESA § 8
(1952), URESA § 8 (1958), and RURESA § 8 (1968), although in none of these statutes is
reimbursement of a political subdivision included in the definition of duty of support.
38. In addition to nationwide federal support programs (Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children, for example), the federal government's unique governmental role in the Dis-
trict might render the United States responsible for local support burdens that state
governments and agencies handle in other jurisdictions. Not surprisingly, the state reim-
bursement language in the Act "makes it clear that governmental agencies providing sup-
port are eligible to bring actions under the act for reimbursement." S. REP. No. 462, supra
note 5, at 2-3. The inference can be drawn that political considerations for minimizing the
financial burden on the federal government were important motives when Congress passed
the District of Columbia URESA.
39. D.C. CODE § 30-306 (1973). The complaint (also known as the petition or declara-
tion), is filed in most states on pre-printed forms. See Fox, supra note 5, at 118. A represen-
tative complaint is set forth at D.C. CODE ENCYCL. 473 (West Supp. 1978) (form 13). The
forms are then filed with the Reciprocal Support Intake Clerk, Office of the Corporation
Counsel, Room 4335, District Building, 500 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20001. The original and three copies of the complaint must be submitted, along with a five
dollar filing fee. The clerk then sets a date for an exparle hearing. The plaintiff appears for
the hearing and answers a series of questions under oath before a judge, who then has the
plaintiff sign the testimony.
40. D.C. CODE § 30-307 (1973). The Act enumerates but does not limit the appropriate
pertinent facts, including the obligor's name and address, a description of both parties' cir-
cumstances, photographs, descriptions of distinguishing marks, fingerprints, aliases, employ-
ers, and social security number. Id.
41. Any person or agency may bring a complaint on behalf of a minor plaintiff without
having been appointed guardian or next friend to the minor. Id § 30-309.
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lumbia Corporation Counsel42 must find the appearance of a duty of sup-
port43 and must determine that the responding state has jurisdiction over
the obligor.' The Corporation Counsel then certifies the complaint to the
responding state.45 After certification, the Corporation Counsel may
waive all costs incurred by the plaintiff46 and, if there is reason to believe
the obligor will flee, may ask the responding state to arrest him.47
When the District of Columbia acts as the responding jurisdiction -
when the obligor is a District resident - the District of Columbia court
must docket the initiating state's certificate48 and refer it to the Corpora-
tion Counsel.49 The Corporation Counsel will act on behalf of the obligee
42. URESA 1950 authorized the district attorney or some state prosecuting official to
represent the obligee; the District version substituted the Corporation Counsel. D.C. CODE
§ 30-308 (1978). For a listing of the various state agencies that handle URESA actions, see
Fox, supra note 5, at 134-35. Section 30-313 designates the Corporation Counsel as Infor-
mation Agent; as such, the Corporation Counsel must transmit copies of the Act to the other
states and jurisdictions with similar reciprocal laws. The Information Agent must also
maintain a registry of courts with URESA jurisdiction in other states. The Corporation
Counsel acts as the representative of the plaintiff but has the option to appoint private coun-
sel if no public support burden is thereby incurred or threatened, and never at the District's
expense. Id § 30-308.
43. There is some uncertainty as to what constitutes the appearance of a duty of sup-
port. One commentator has written:
This review is not a complicated process; indeed, the National Conference com-
mentary on the original URESA points out that the initiating court is simply ex-
pected to "look over" the petition to see if the facts show a support obligation.
This is akin to a determination whether a complaint in an ordinary civil case states
a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is also closely related to a determina-
tion of "probable cause" in a criminal court. The court is not expected to go be-
yond this loose review and is definitely not to render any finding or conclusion as
to the obligor's ultimate liability.
Fox, supra note 5, at 120.
44. "[Tlhe court normally determines only that the obligor is likely to be physically
present in the responding state." Id
45. Three copies each of the certificate, the complaint, and the District's law are for-
warded to the responding state. D.C. CODE § 30-310 (1973). The papers may be sent to the
state information agency if the responding court's address is unknown. See Fox, supra note
5, at 123.
46. The Act reserves to the District of Columbia the discretion to assess costs and fees.
D.C. CODE § 30-311 (1973). The District may waive such costs, however, only if the plaintiff
states by affidavit that he or she is unwilling to pay. Additionally, the court may waive costs
incurred when a state acts as plaintiff, provided the plaintiff state has similar fee waiver
provisions. Id
47. A defendant may flee once he is served with process. See HANDBOOK (1952), supra
note 4, at 291.
48. D.C. CODE § 30-314(a) (1973). If inaccuracies are present, the court must keep the
case pending and return the complaint. Id. § 30-314(b).
49. The court may refer the matter to private counsel, although this is rarely done. Id §
30-314(a).
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and bring the action for breach of support against the obligor. In its role
as responding jurisdiction, the District of Columbia court has authority to
order support payments if it finds that a duty of support has been
breached."0 If support payments are ordered, the court must transmit to
the initiating state a certified copy of all orders entered against the defend-
ant" and disburse all payments received from the defendant to the obligee
or to the court in the initiating state.5 2 If the defendant refuses to make
payments ordered by a District of Columbia court in URESA proceedings,
the plaintiff and the District of Columbia, as the responding jurisdiction,
may resort to any URESA or non-URESA remedies.53
II. AMENDMENTS ABSENT FROM THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA URESA:
THE REGISTRATION PROCEDURE AND OTHER PROVISIONS
Because the District of Columbia URESA was modeled after the 1952
draft of the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and has not
been amended since its enactment in 1957, it lacks major provisions that
now appear in nearly every state URESA. In addition, an important pro-
vision pertaining to criminal enforcement of support orders54 included in
most state URESAs was omitted from the District's version of the Act.55
50. Id. § 30-315. This provision empowers the District to require a bond or cash de-
posit and preserves the contempt remedies available in any other suit if a defendant violates
an order made pursuant to URESA.
51. Id § 30-316.
52. Certified copies of all payments received and disbursed must be made available for
transmission where necessary to other states. Id § 30-317.
53. All URESA remedies are additional to, not substitutes for, any other remedies. Id
§ 30-303. See Figliozzi v. Figliozzi, 173 A.2d 904 (D.C. 1961) (D.C. CODE § 16-415 (1951), a
non-URESA statute, used to increase amount of prior URESA award); Menetrez v. Mene-
trez, 147 A.2d 772 (D.C. 1959) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by increasing URESA
award beyond the amount requested by plaintiff wife and initiating state). Long-arm stat-
utes and other uniform laws may be employed to supplement the URESA remedies. See
Comment, supra note 6, at 57. The District of Columbia URESA further provides that the
District may avail itself of the same remedies as the obligor to recover expenses incurred in
supporting the obhgee. D.C. CODE § 30-305 (1973). Under this provision, the District may
recover past costs or continuing costs, as in a situation where an abandoned infant is institu-
tionalized. See note 10 supra.
54. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 110.051 (1977); VA. CODE § 20-88.16 (1975); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 52.10(5) (West Supp. 1979).
55. S. REP. No. 462, supra note 5, at 3, explained the provision's absence from the
District's URESA:
It would not be practical to enact for the District of Columbia provisions such as
those in section 5 of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act for the
reason that the District is a Federal jurisdiction where Federal removal procedure
is used whenever it is necessary to return to the District a person charged with
crime. In any event, it is felt that the new civil remedy provided. . . will to a large
[Vol. 29:961
Enforcement of Support Act
The criminal enforcement rules provide for extradition of the obligor on
demand by the initiating state but allow the responding state's governor
discretion to deny the demand if the obligor begins complying with the
support order.56 This provision is intended to deter an obligor from choos-
ing not to comply with an outstanding, reciprocally enforced support or-
der.57
Perhaps the most important amendment missing from the District's Act
is the registration procedure incorporated by the National Commissioners
into the 1958 version of the model act.58 The basic purpose of registration
is simplification of the URESA process by permitting courts to enforce
support orders from other jurisdictions as if they were locally issued.59
The defendant may oppose the registration, but he is limited to defenses
available in an action on a foreign judgment.6° The obligee's jurisdiction,
the rendering state, 6 creates the support order and forwards it to the obli-
extent eliminate the necessity for resort to criminal proceedings in cases involving
failure to support, where the person owing the duty is out of the District.
56. RURESA §§ 5-6 (1968); URESA §§ 5-6 (1958).
57. Problems with the extradition and criminal sanctions were noted early in the history
of URES A. Incarceration is counter-productive since a jailed obligor is less likely to be able
to support an obligee. Moreover, incarceration may cause the obligor to lose his job, irrepa-
rably harm his relation with the obligee, and affect his prospects for future employment.
Thus, as a result of incarceration, the cost to the state doubles, for it must now support not
only the obligee, but the obligor it has extradited as well. See Brockelbank, supra note 1, at
94. One commentator has characterized URESA as a quasi-civil proceeding because the
prospect of imprisonment is always present. Comment, supra note 6, at 58. In reality, how-
ever, these provisions are rarely used.
58. The registration procedure was included as Part IV of URESA 1958. See note 14
supra. Dean Fox commented favorably that the registration process obviates what he has
labeled the five-step URESA process: 1) identification of the support duty by the obligee; 2)
filing the petition; 3) initiating court review and location of the obligor; 4) hearing in the
responding court; and 5) issuance of the support order. Fox, supra note 5, at 115-30. Less
significant improvements include provisions to permit enforcement of all support duties,
including arrearages, in addition to present and prospective amounts while exempting the
obligee from paying costs; papers can be transferred automatically to the responding juris-
diction if the initiating state has sent them to the wrong jurisdiction; the support order may
also be forwarded directly between counties of the responding state; furthermore, the obligor
is permitted to present defenses, and the responding state must continue the case if he does
so. Id. §§ 9, 19, 21 and 24.
The 1968 amendments give the state attorney general the authority to order local prosecu-
tors to enforce vigorously an order to prosecute a URESA case, or the case may be removed
and prosecuted at the state level. RURESA § 12 (1968), supra note 14. Machinery for the
State Information Agency is improved to aid in locating the obligor. Id
59. See HANDBOOK (1958), supra note 14, at 241-42.
60. These defenses include lack of jurisdiction or procedural defects. Fox, supra note 5,
at 132.
61. RURESA § 2(k) (1968), supra note 14.
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gor's jurisdicton, the registering state.62 Once the procedures of the Act are
61met, the foreign support order has the same force and effect as if it were
entered originally in the responding-registering state.64
One particular advantage of the registration process is that registering
states need not be concerned with conflicts in the substantive law between
the initiating and responding jurisdictions or questions of granting foreign
support orders full faith and credit, since the law of the registering state
may treat the support order as if locally entered and apply its own law to
the whole proceeding. The District of Columbia URESA, however, does
not include a registration provision, and, consequently, District of Colum-
bia courts are beset by confusion on questions involving these issues.
III. DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA URESA ACTIONS
When the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws drafted the original URESA in 1950, they permitted the obligee to
elect whether the law of the responding state or that of the initiating state
should apply to the support action.65 Under these provisions, the obligee
could first determine which state's law was more favorable, then request
the responding state to apply that choice. 66 The election provision,67 al-
62. Id § 2(1).
63. Dean Fox has outlined the registration process as follows:
I. The obligee or the rendering court sends the registering court: (a) three certi-
fied copies of the support order and any modifications; (b) one copy of the render-
ing state's URESA; (c) a verified statement by the obligee describing the obligor's
location, the obligor's property and naming the other states in which the order is
already registered.
2. The registering court files the order in the "Registry of Foreign Support Or-
ders," serves the obligor, dockets the case and notifies the prosecuting attorney.
3. Once registered, the order is to be treated as any other support order issued by
the registering state and is "subject to the same procedure, defense and proceedings
for reopening, vacating or staying."
4. The obligor has twenty days to respond to the notice of registration and is
limited, at the hearing, to matters that would be available to him as defenses, "in
an action to enforce a foreign money judgment."
Fox, supra note 5, at 132 (quoting RURESA (1968), reprinted at HANDBOOK (1968), supra
note 61).
64. See Note, Uniform Recirocal Legislation to Enforce Familial Duties ofSuppor, 25
DRAKE L. REV. 206, 213 (1975).
65. The original URESA read,
[d]uties of support enforcible [sic] under this law are those imposed or imposable
under the laws of any state where the alleged obligor was present during the period
for which support is sought or where the obligee is present when the failure to
support commenced, at the election of the obligee.
URESA § 7 (1950), reprinted in HANDBOOK (1950), supra note 2, at 177.
66. The election provision unambiguously permitted forum shopping by the plaintiff-
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though rejected by most jurisdictions, is still the law in two states" and has
never been found unconstitutional.69
Shortly after its adoption, the election provision was criticized by Dean
Edward Stimson, who proposed a territorial theory of choice of law under
URESA. According to Stimson's theory, the applicable law in support
proceedings should be the substantive law of the jurisdiction where the
obligor is present.7° Despite some initial hostility to this proposal,7' the
obligee. The provision, however, may have been intended to permit the obligee to elect only
if the residence of the obligor was unknown. See Comment, Choice of Law: Interstate En-
forcement of Duties of Support, 1965 DUKE L.J. 356, 361 & n.27 (1965).
67. The election provision was incorporated into the original URESA to counter a sig-
nificant body of authority that prohibited recognition of foreign support judgments. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 457-458 (1934) (no state can impose a statu-
tory duty of support upon any person who was not domiciled in that state or subject to its
jurisdiction when the suit was begun). Options available prior to URESA were limited: the
obligee could either wait for the obligor to return to the obligee's forum, pursue the obligor
in the obligor's forum, or extradite the obligor should the support duty involve criminal
sanctions. Comment, supra note 66, at 357-58. Since none of these options was particularly
effective, the Commissioners opted for the obligee's election provision. A responding state
could, however, refuse to apply the initiating state's law for public policy or equal protection
reasons. See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 506 (1941) (public policy can be reason to
deny full faith and credit); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Judd, 45 N.J. 46, 50, 211 A.2d
198, 200 (1965) (New Jersey would not enforce reciprocal duty that violated public policy or
equal protection).
68. The election provision has been retained in Mississippi. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-11-
15 (1972). In Minnesota, the election is given to the court, not to the obligee. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.48 (West 1969).
69. See Comment, supra note 66, at 356. The election provision was approved as re-
cently as 1966 in Texas, although that state has since adopted the presence test. See Bjorgo
v. Bjorgo, 402 S.W.2d 143, 148 (Tex. 1966) (not a denial of equal protection to enforce
against a Texas resident an obligation of support incurred in another state before residence
in Texas was acquired, which cannot under Texas law be imposed upon a Texas resident
who has not incurred the obligation elsewhere). Accord, Mehrstein v. Mehrstein, 245 Cal.
App. 2d 646, 54 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1966) (choice of law by obligee permitted under URESA
election provision). Borgo disavowed dictum from the earlier case of California v. Copus,
309 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967 (1958) (Texas Supreme Court held son, a
Texas resident, not liable for the support expenses of his mother confined in a California
mental institution).
70. Stimson based his conclusions on an analysis of Commonwealth v. Acker, 197
Mass. 91, 93, 83 N.E. 312, 312-13 (1908) (where obligor fails to support his wife and minor
child, his neglect of that duty occurs where he resides - not where the obligees reside).
Stimson asserted:
The rule that was employed in this case is that, in order to determine whether
personal legal rights and duties were created or continue to exist in relations be-
tween persons in different states, the applicable law is the law to which the person
alleged to be under the duty was subject at the significant time and not the law to
which the person claiming the right was subject.
Stimson, Simplifying the Conflict of Laws.- A Bill Proposedfor Enactment by the Congress, 36
A.B.A.J. 1003, 1005 (1950).
71. Professor Albert Ehrenzweig criticized Stimson's analysis for two reasons. First,
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election provision was quickly deleted from the model URESA7 2 and was
replaced by Stimson's theory, the presence test.73 Judicial interpretations
in most jurisdictions reflect adherence to the presence test in both URESA
and non-URESA proceedings. 4
The choice of law provision in the District of Columbia URESA differs
substantially from the presence test as adopted in other state URESA
acts. 75 The District of Columbia statute is actually somewhat similar to
the election provisons of the 1950 URESA but does not, however, indicate
who is to make the election. Specifically, the section makes enforceable
these duties of support: duties imposed by any forums where the obligor
was present during the time for which support is sought; duties imposed
by the obligee's forum when the failure to support first occurs; or duties
imposed by the obligee's forum when the failure to support is ongoing.76
District of Columbia courts have usually interpreted this choice of law sec-
Acker was a criminal case while URESA proceedings are usually civil in nature. Second, as
a policy matter, the Acker holding invites deserters to choose a residence with a law
favorable to them. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition ofSupport Duties, 42 CALIF. L. REV.
382, 389 (1954). Stimson's presence theory, however, was ultimately incorporated into
URESA.
72. The election provision also permitted an obligee to move to a forum recognizing a
new duty of support and sue on the new obligation. Apparently for this reason the Commis-
sioners rejected the election rule, calling it "hurriedly drafted." The word "hurriedly" was
later deleted from the HANDBOOK (1952). Ehrenzweig, supra note 71, at 388 & n.43.
The Commissioners also wanted to prevent the obligee from being free to choose the most
favorable law available. Id at 388 & n.45. "It was never intended that she [the obligee]
should have an absolute right to choose the applicable law as her interest might dictate."
HANDBOOK (1952), supra note 4, at 298.
73. An account of Stimson's territorial analysis and the development of the presence
test appears in Legislation, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 168, 170 n.10 (1966).
74. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 211 (1933) (non-URESA sup-
port action) (character and extent of father's obligation, and status of minor, are determined
ordinarily not by place of minor's residence but by law of father's domicile); Engelson v.
Mallea, 180 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Iowa 1970) (law of state where obligor was present during
support period sought applies); Irving v. Ford, 183 Mass. 448, 451, 67 N.E. 366, 367 (1903)
(law of the father's domicile applies to legitimization of his child); Daly v. Daly, 39 N.J.
Super. 117, 122, 120 A.2d 510, 513, af'd, 21 N.J. 599, 123 A.2d 3 (1956) (duty of support
exists under laws of New Jersey even where children reside outside state); Rolette Co. ex rel
Welfare Bd. v. Eltobgi, 221 N.W.2d 645, 647 (N.D. 1974) (laws of state where obligor resides
determine nature and extent of his obligations).
75. Compare URESA § 7 (1958) with D.C. CODE § 30-304 (1973). Both provisions are
quoted in note 76 infra.
76. D.C. CODE § 30-304 (1973), reads:
Duties of support enforcible [sic] under this chapter are those imposed under the
laws of any State in which the defendant was present during the period for which
support is sought, or in which the dependent was present when the failure to sup-
port commenced or where the dependent is when the failure to support continues.
The presence test is set forth at RURESA § 7 (1968), reprinted in HANDBOOK (1968), supra
note 14, and reads: "Duties of support applicable under this act are those imposed under the
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tion as if it stated a presence test. Recently, however, trial courts have split
on the appropriate choice of law in determining the age of majority of a
dependent obligee when the District is the responding jurisdiction. This
division of authority is the product of unclear judicial interpretations of
the District of Columbia choice of law provision that have resulted from
the basic ambiguity of the Act itself.
A4. Early Interpretations of the Choice of Law Provision.: Edmonds,
Cobbe, and Watson
In Edmonds v. Edmonds,7 the District of Columbia Municipal Court of
Appeals construed the URESA choice of law provision to prescribe a pres-
ence test. In Edmonds, the plaintiff, taking her two children with her, left
her husband while the couple was residing in Virginia. The defendant
husband then moved to the District of Columbia, where he was sued by
the plaintiff for child support under URESA. The trial court dismissed,
finding no support duty under either District of Columbia or Virginia law.
The District of Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals reversed, interpret-
ing the URESA choice of law section78 as dictating that District of Colum-
bia law must apply,79 and ruling that the trial court erred in finding no
duty of support under District of Columbia law. Reasonable support for
the children was ordered.8°
In 1960, the District of Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals handed
down Cobbe v. CobbeY the most cited - and most ambiguous - local
opinion concerning choice of law under the District of Columbia URESA.
In Cobbe, the sixteen-year-old plaintiff brought a URESA action through
her mother, a District resident, as next friend. The daughter had been
placed in her father's custody in Florida after the parents were divorced
laws of any state where the obligor was present for the period during which support is
sought."
77. 146 A.2d 774 (D.C. 1958).
78. The section was then D.C. CODE § 11-1604 (Supp VI 1951) and it is identical to
D.C. CODE § 30-304 (1973).
79. The court based its conclusion solely on the fact that, since leaving Virginia in 1949,
the defendant resided continuously in the District of Columbia. 146 A.2d at 775. Unfortu-
nately, the court did not address the other two enforceable support duties it might have
recognized under the District of Columbia URESA - those imposed by the obligee's forum
at the time the failure to support begins or where the failure to support continues. D.C.
CODE § 30-304 (1973). In Edmonds, those support duties would have been governed by the
laws of Virginia. If the District law did not recognize a support duty, but Virginia law did,
the court would have been forced to choose between a support duty present in the initiating
state but absent in the responding state.
80. 146 A.2d at 776.
81. 163 A.2d 333 (D.C. 1960).
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there.82 The daughter's preference, however, was to reside with her
mother, which she did and for which she sought support. The trial court in
the District considered itself bound by a Florida custody decree that
granted custody to the father, reasoning that the decree relieved him of the
duty to provide support because the daughter had refused to live in his
home. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, however,
holding that changed circumstances warranted redetermination of custody
according to the law of the jurisdiction where the child resided.83
The wording of the Cobbe opinion is ambiguous, allowing the following
readings: regarding choice of law, breach of a duty of support is found by
the court of the responding state referring to the substantive law of the
initiating state; or, breach of a duty of support is found by the court of the
responding state referring to the substantive law of the responding state.84
The Cobbe court seems to have meant the latter, because it approved the
presence test and because it indicated that its holding would narrow the
choices presented in the District of Columbia URESA choice of law sec-
tion. 85 Moreover, the court's reliance on Jackson v. Hall8 6 clarifies its in-
tent that the presence test apply in the District. In Jackson, the Florida
Supreme Court strictly limited the initiating forum to determining whether
82. After divorcing her husband, the mother moved with her children to the District.
Illness forced her to give custody to her husband in Florida shortly thereafter and a decree
to that effect was issued. The daughter resisted this action, however, and was living in the
District with her mother at the time the suit was instituted. Id at 334-35.
83. Id at 335-37.
84. The Cobbe opinion reads:
The duty of our courts, when the District of Columbia is the initiating jurisdic-
tion, is to ascertain if "the defendant owes a duty of support" in the sense of there
being an obligor-obligee relationship like that of husband-wife or parent-child.
Thereafter, the applicable law to determine defendant's liability for the breach of
that duty is governed by the law of the responding state.
Id. at 336 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
The crucial word that, by referring back to the duty found in the initiating state, can
transform both the meaning of the paragraph and of Cobbe. The Cobbe court did not mean
that the responding state was to apply the law of the initiating state. To the contrary, the
court approved Florida's use of the presence test, stating: "Florida has said the law of the
responding jurisdiction will be used to determine the duty of support, and it is to be applied
by the courts of that state as they interpret it. We think this view commends itself both in
logic and in practicability." Id. at 337.
85. The Cobbe court stated that, in its view, the presence test "limits the choices avail-
able to the obligee under Code 1951, § 11-1604 (Supp. VIII) [D.C. CODE § 30-304 (1973)],
but we think it represents the prevailing thought in the country today." 163 A.2d at 336. In
fact, the obligee had no choices, since the statute did not provide for an obligee's election.
The Cobbe court may have been referring to the three choice of law provisions found in the
District of Columbia URESA, supra note 76, and may have been presuming that the District
of Columbia court would make the choice of law for the obligee.
86. 97 So. 2d I (Fla. 1957).
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the petition of the obligee, on its face, indicates the appearance of a duty of
support.87 Ultimate findings as to a duty of support and liablity for the
breach of that duty were ruled the exclusive province of the responding
jurisdiction's courts and law.88 Nonetheless, the Cobbe decision, and in
particular, one ambiguously phrased sentence,89 have been interpreted by
trial courts to require application of the initiating state's substantive law,
the opposite of the presence test.90
In the last major District case interpreting choice of law under URESA,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided once more in favor of
the presence test. In Watson v. Dreadin,91 the plaintiff (grandmother), a
Florida resident, sought funds from her daughter, a District resident, to
pay for support of the daughter's child. The District of Columbia appel-
late court awarded the support, refused to adjudicate the question of valid
custody, and held the URESA statute constitutional as applied.92 Watson
reduced the function of the initiating court to merely acknowledging a
prima facie showing of a duty of support. Under Watson, the responding
court using its own substantive law must decide whether in fact there is a
duty of support, whether it has been breached, and what support should be
granted.93 Because Watson applies the law of the District in a case where
the District is the responding jurisdiction, it represents further judicial ap-
proval of the presence test for determination of choice of law in District of
Columbia URESA proceedings.
B. Division in the District of Columbia Trial Courts.- Conflicting
Application of the Choice of Law Provision
While the Edwards, Cobbe, and Watson decisions in effect adopted the
presence test, they have been relied upon by District of Columbia trial
courts to reach different conclusions. The Cobbe decision, in particular,
has yielded disparate results by virtue of varying interpretations of its lan-
guage. In Hall v. Hall,94 for example, the obligor, a District resident,
87. Id at 3. The initiating court's review of the petition need only be a cursory exami-
nation to determine whether the appearance of a duty of support is indicated. See note 43
supra.
88. 97 So. 2d at 3.
89. See note 84 supra (placement of the word "that" can alter court's meaning).
90. An erroneous reading of Cobbe may lead to the conclusion that a responding juris-
diction, in ascertaining whether there has been a violation of support law, must confine its
inquiry to the statutory and judicial law of the initiating state, and must limit or expand its
support order to satisfy the duty of support as defined by the initiating state.
91. 309 A.2d 493 (D.C. 1973).
92. Id. at 496.
93. Id. at 495.
94. No. RS7-68 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1978).
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sought termination of a URESA support order on the grounds that his two
dependent children, California residents, had reached eighteen, the age of
majority in that state. The District of Columbia Corporation Counsel ar-
gued for the obligees that support must continue until the children reach
twenty-one, the age of majority in the District.95 Judge John F. Doyle
resolved the case in favor of the obligees, holding that the responding
state's support law determines the age at which a child is no longer entitled
to receive child support. The court cited Cobbe and the first enumerated
support duty under the statute96 as its authority.
The opposite result was reached in Neal v. Gibson,9 7 where the plaintiff
sued her ex-husband, a District resident, for support of their eighteen-year-
old daughter, a North Carolina resident. The defendant argued that since
under North Carolina law his daughter had attained her majority, he owed
no support duty. Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, citing Cobbe and Wat-
son, held that the responding jurisdiction must determine, under the sup-
port law of the initiating state, whether in fact there is a duty of support.9"
Since the North Carolina age of majority is eighteen, she reasoned, no
such duty existed under the law of the initiating state. Accordingly, she
dismissed plaintiffs suit.9 9
In a third District of Columbia case, Goodwin v. Goodwin,"° the court
addressed a similar situation and reached the same conclusion as in Neal v.
Gibson, but based that conclusion on different reasoning. In Goodwin, the
parties, husband and wife, had resided in Kentucky and had obtained a
divorce there. The husband then moved to the District, where the District
of Columbia Superior Court ordered him to pay child support pursuant to
the wife's Kentucky URESA petition. When the parties' youngest child
reached eighteen, the age of majority in Kentucky, the husband petitioned
to terminate the support obligation. Judge Samuel B. Block, noting the
conflicting results of Neal and Hall, terminated the support payments, bas-
ing his decision in part on Cobbe,l°' and in part on a non-URESA deci-
95. Barnett v. Barnett, 243 A.2d 51, 53 (D.C. 1968).
96. D.C. CODE § 30-304 (1973) (duties of support of any state in which the defendant
was present during the period for which support is sought are enforceable).
97. No. RS622-75R (D.C. Super. Ct. 1977).
98. Judge Johnson relied upon the paragraph in the Cobbe opinion that ambiguously
defines the functions of the initiating and responding jurisdictions when determining a duty
of support. See No. RS622-75R, at 1-2 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1977) (citing Cobbe, 163 A.2d at
336, note 84 supra).
99. The suit was dismissed without prejudice to permit North Carolina to review the
complaint, and, if a support duty were found, to permit refiling in the District. No. RS622-
75R, at 2 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1977).
100. No. RS592-74R (D.C. Super Ct. 1979).
101. The Goodwin court cited the paragraph in Cobbe containing the ambiguous choice
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sion, Alves v. Alves.' z Additionally, the Goodwin court found support for
its decision in two other factors. First, it stated that "no additional role"
would be served in aiding sister states to enforce support duties by ex-
tending the duty of support beyond that recognized in the initiating
state. 103 Second, the court declined to "expand the reach of the statute" to
encompass support duties for children recognized as adults in their home
states. 04
of law language, see note 84, supra, and applied an interesting interpretation whereby the
responding state establishes the obligor's support obligation after the initiating state has de-
termined the dependent's status as a minor or adult. Goodwin, supra note 100, at 3. The
initiating state's determination of majority or minority, however, was originally intended to
involve only a cursory review to establish the appearance of a duty of support. Kentucky
law describes the process as a determination of whether "the complaint sets forthfacts from
which it may be determined that the defendant owes a duty of support." Ky. REV. STAT. §
407.210 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). See note 43 supra. The actual determination of all
legal issues in URESA cases, with or without the presence test, is made by the court of the
responding jurisdiction.
102. The Goodwin court's reliance on Alves v. Alves, 346 A.2d 736 (D.C. 1975), provides
little clarification for URESA choice of law questions. Alves is a non-URESA decision,
involving the determination of the effect of a Maryland separation agreement that called for
support until the dependent children's age of majority. The husband/obligor had sought to
terminate those payments when his children reached eighteen, Maryland having by then
changed its age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen. Because the Alves court was inter-
preting a separation agreement that was entered into in Mayland but not incorporated into
the District divorce decree, definition of the agreement's terms depended upon the intent of
the parties. Because intent was determined under Maryland law, because the mother and
children resided in Maryland, and because Maryland, in Monticello v. Monticello, 271 Md.
168, 315 A.2d 520, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974), had determined that the lowered age of
majority was prospective only, the parties were held to have intended child support be paid
until the age of twenty-one. Moreover, reliance on Alves was intended to provide the Good-
win court with authority to do what it was already empowered to do under the District of
Columbia URESA: look to the law of the state where "the dependent was present when the
failure to support commenced or . . . continues." D.C. CODE § 30-304 (1973).
103. Goodwin, supra note 100, at 4. The Goodwin court has indicated a major weakness
in the presence test. Since the purpose of URESA was in part to alleviate support burdens
that fell to states when obligors deserted, there is nothing to be gained by enforcing duties
beyond those recognized in the initiating state. Presumably, the initiating state has recog-
nized duties of support sufficient to protect it from increased public support burdens. Never-
theless, the presence test was meant to apply to support duties as they exist in the responding
state, whether or not they exceed those recognized in the intiating state. Since the presence
test has been endorsed in Cobbe, see note 84 and accompanying text supra, the Goodwin
court has taken issue not only with the presence test, but also with prior law in the District.
104. Goodwin supra note 100, at 4. Enforcement of support duties for children who have
reached their majority in their home state would not expand the scope of the District of
Columbia URESA for two reasons. First, application of the District law is already provided
for by statute. D.C. CODE § 30-304 (1973) (first choice of law listed). Second, since prior
law in the District recognized the presence test as the preferred approach, application of the
presence test in Goodwin would not have been an expansion. See notes 77-93 accompanying
text supra.
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Neal, Goodwin, and Hall represent the conflict of interpretation that ex-
ists among District of Columbia trial courts regarding choices of law under
the District of Columbia URESA statute. None of the results in these
three cases is patently incorrect, considering the ambiguous state of
URESA law in the District. Nevertheless, to assure uniform application of
the District of Columbia URESA, the disparity between Neal, Goodwin,
and Hall must be resolved.
C Resolution of the Choice of Law Problem
The presence test, which applies the law of the obligor's forum in
URESA proceedings, has been adopted by the majority of jurisdictions in
the United States.° 5 Accordingly, obligors are held to whatever duties of
support exist in the responding state. This approach is most consistent
with the choice of law theories approved by the United States Supreme
Court in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 0 6 where the Court's reasoning ap-
proximates the presence test in pre-URESA litigation.'0 7 Although deci-
sions in several extraordinary cases have deviated for either equitable or
public policy reasons,0 8 courts construing the URESA statute's presence
105. See note 12 supra. Almost every jurisdiction has included the presence test in its
URESA statute. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-4-84 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 25.25.060 (1977);
CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1670 (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5-108 (1973); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b-184 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 620 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
88.081 (1964); GA. CODE § 99-9907(a) (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 576-21 (1976); IDAHO
CODE § 7-1054 (1947); IND. CODE § 31-2-1-7 (1979); IOWA CODE § 252A.3(i) (1975); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-457 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 407.150 (1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 89c § 7
(1957); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52A-8 (1976); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.21 (Vernon 1975);
W. VA. CODE § 48-9-7 (1976).
106. 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (law of obligor's domicile controls). But see 290 U.S. at 227
(recognition should be afforded to the interest of the obligee's state to secure the adequate
protection of helpless citizens and prospective citizens) (Stone, J., dissenting).
107. Both before and after Yarborough, state courts in non-URESA proceedings had
determined support obligations under the law of the obligor's domicile. See, e.g., Elkind v.
Byck, 68 Cal. 2d 453, 439 P.2d 316, 67 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1968) (Georgia divorce decree modifi-
able as to child support under Yarborough rationale where obligor resides in California);
Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915 (1892) (laws of father's domicile determine legitima-
tion of child). See also Irving v. Ford, 183 Mass. 448, 67 N.E. 366 (1903); Berkley v. Berk-
ley, 246 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1952).
108. In Vincenza v. Vincenza, 197 Misc. 1027, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 470 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950), a
father, domiciled in New York, sought support from his adult children whom he had aban-
doned during their minority and who now lived in New Jersey. The New York court, noting
that a New Jersey statute exempted abandoned children from a duty to support their par-
ents, refused to certify the petition, exercising its discretion to dismiss the case. 197 Misc. at
1035, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 479. Similarly, in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Judd, 45 N.J. 46,
211 A.2d 198 (1965), California had certified a petition for support against a parent in New
Jersey, seeking payments for a child institutionalized in California. California law would
not have permitted recovery against a parent domiciled in California. The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that even if New Jersey recognized a duty to maintain an adult child, it
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test have overwhelmingly applied the law of the obligor's domicile in de-
termining support duties.'0 9
Most District of Columbia courts have relied on the presence test to re-
solve all choice of law questions arising under the District of Columbia
URESA. "0 The result reached in Hall v. Hall,"' where support payments
were continued to age twenty-one despite the obligee's majority at eighteen
in California, comports with the presence test. Edmonds, Cobbe, and Wat-
son support the Hall result even though it is conceivable that an obligor
might choose to reside in the most favorable jurisdiction to him, i e., the
jurisdiction with the lowest age of majority.
The Cobbe court may have recognized the statute's potential for confu-
sion and may have sought to prevent inconsistent application of the law by
approving the presence test." 2 It was not entirely successful, however, be-
cause the language of the opinion is unclear and because the statute not
only states a presence test,' 13 but also sets forth additional choice of law
tests requiring District of Columbia courts to make an election before ap-
plying any state's law." 4 In Hall, the choice of law applied was that of the
District and the statutory clause cited made enforceable "the laws of any
State in which the defendant was present during the period for which sup-
port is sought.""' 5 In Neal, the court looked to the law of North Carolina,
and the applicable statutory clause that was not, but could have been, cited
made enforceable "the laws of any State . . . in which the dependent was
present when the failure to support commenced or where the failure to
would not enforce that duty because to do so would violate public policy and the state's
equal protection clause.
109. In Engelson v. Mallea, the court stated, "Iowa law within and without the uniform
support act governs respondent's duty to support, and the duty to support includes the dura-
tion of that duty." 180 N.W.2d 127, 133 (Iowa 1970). See also Wheeler v. Wheeler, 196
Kan. 697, 702, 414 P.2d I, 3 (1966) (law of responding state controls); Bing v. Bing, 86 N.J.
Super. 246, 252, 206 A.2d 606, 609 (1965) (substantive law of the responding state governs);
Childers v. Childers, 19 N.C. App. 220, 224-25, 198 S.E.2d 485, 488 (1973) (law of state
where obligor found governs); New Jersey v. Morales, 35 Ohio App. 2d 56, 63, 299 N.E.2d
920, 924 (1973) (construing OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3115.03-3115.06 (page 1953), the court
concluded that Ohio [obligor's] law with regard to what constitutes the duty to support mi-
nor children of the parties must be applied).
110. See notes 80-98 and accompanying text supra.
I 11. No. RS7-68 (D.C. Super Ct. 1978).
112. The Cobbe court indicated that application of the presence test would actually limit
the choices available under the District of Columbia URESA, calling that result logical and
practical. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
113. D.C. CODE § 30-304 (1973) (reprinted at note 76 supra).
114. The Goodwin court noted the possibility of confusion inherent in the establishment
of conflicting choices of law: "This potential application of the law of three separate forums
has led to antinomious results in the District of Columbia trial courts." Supra note 100, at 2.
115. No. RS7-68, at 2-3 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1978).
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support continues."' 16 The latter statutory provision likewise could have
been relied upon as the sole authority for the Goodwin decision." 7
The District of Columbia URESA, therefore, still retains an election
provision, a feature that was included in the original URESA model act
and was later eliminated in nearly every other jurisdiction.'18 District of
Columbia courts, however, not the obligee as in the original URESA, must
actually make a choice of law election under the three-prong choice of law
section.' '9 Without a uniform guide to such elections, the results in the
District of Columbia Superior Court can remain inconsistent. To avoid
uncertainty, one choice of law should be made in circumstances similar to
those presented in Neal, Goodwin, and Hall.
Notwithstanding the inclusion of the presence test in most URESA stat-
utes, the "home forum" test as applied in Neal and Goodwin comports
with basic notions of fundamental fairness and should be applied in the
District. The Neal and Goodwin courts, by compelling support only until
the minor's home forum acknowledges his majority, have merely made
unavailable the protections of the laws of a jurisdiction with which he may
never have had contact. Additionally, since his domicile will recognize
him as an adult at age eighteen, the Neal and Goodwin decisions do not
deprive the minor of any right available to him in his home forum.
Dicta in at least one decision provide support for the result in Neal and
Goodwin. In Burney v. Vance,' 20 the parties, husband and wife, were di-
vorced in Kentucky, where the age of majority is eighteen. The wife and
child subsequently domiciled in Florida, where the age of majority is
116. In looking to North Carolina law, the Neal court chose to dismiss the complaint,
suggesting that the initiating state, North Carolina, review the complaint to see whether
under North Carolina law a duty of support still existed. Neal v. Gibson, No. RS622-75, at
2 (D.C. Super Ct. 1977). Since 18 is the age of majority in that state, the petition could never
be referred back to the District because the petitioner could never make the required prima
facie showing of a duty of support to the North Carolina court.
117. The Goodwin court might simply have stated the existence of the choices in D.C.
CODE § 30-304 (1973), and then applied, for equitable reasons, the second listed choice.
118. The legislative history of the District of Columbia URESA is silent as to the reason
three choices of law are set out without a provision for court or obligee election. Perhaps
Congress, in its concern that obligor's be subject to the maximum possible support obliga-
tion, simply decided to lump together all the choices present in the original URESA, believ-
ing that the statute would thereby cover every conceivable contingency. See S. REP. No.
462, supra note 5; H.R. REP. No. 525, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
119. Since application of all three tests would usually result in conflicting choices of law,
at least in the age of majority situation, the court must choose which one to apply. To date,
however, no District of Columbia court has recognized that this section requires an election.
Acknowledging the necessity for an election would alleviate some of the ambiguity inherent
in the District of Columbia URESA choice of law decisions.
120. 17 Ohio Misc. 307, 246 N.E.2d 371 (C.P. Clermont Cty. 1969).
[Vol. 29:961
Enforcement of Support Act
twenty-one; the husband began residing in Ohio, where the age of majority
is also twenty-one. The Ohio court in Burney ordered child support to age
twenty-one, noting that if the age of majority in Florida and Ohio had
differed, the court would have been inclined to rule the law of the child's
domicile controlling. 121
Should the District of Columbia Court of Appeals consider this choice
of law issue, it could decide that, when the District as the responding juris-
diction has laws that differ from those of the initiating state in URESA age
of majority cases, the substantive law of the initiating state - the home
forum test - should apply. This result would comport with the approach
suggested twenty years ago by Professor Albert Ehrenzweig, 2 2 would cre-
ate uniformity in superior court decisions, and would present the fairest
result: dependents would be entitled to support only until their home fo-
rum recognizes them as adults. This approach would be statutorily per-
missible given the choices available under the District of Columbia
URESA.123 Furthermore, the District of Columbia could also apply the
second aspect of Ehrenzweig's formula, essentially a protection against fo-
rum shopping, by refusing to recognize the initiating state's age of majority
if it could be shown that the dependent moved solely to gain legal and
financial advantage.
24
By adopting an approach that differs radically from the traditional pres-
ence test, the District of Columbia could become a URESA innovator.
The home forum test would, however, implicitly overrule Cobbe, Watson,
and Edmonds, prior cases that sought to apply a strict presence test. De-
spite this departure from prior law, the result in Neal and Goodwin, be-
121. Id. at 373-74 (court stated that, if such a distinction had been necessary, its inclina-
tion would have been to rule that the law of the state where the child resided would be
determinative). The Burney court noted its decision was made "with the full knowledge that
a mother could move from state to state and keep the support in force where it would origi-
nally be barred." Id.
122. Prof. Ehrenzweig suggested giving control to the law of the obligee's state in
determing the duty of support. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Support Duties, 42
CALIF. L. REV. 382, 390 (1954). The Ehrenzweig approach avoids the situation in which an
obligee who is under 21 and legally a minor is denied support by a responding state whose
age of majority is 18. Similarly, the approach also avoids permitting an obligee who is
emancipated in the initiating state at age 18 from collecting support for an additional three
years merely because the obligor lives in a jurisdiction where the age of majority is 21.
123. A District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision, or the District of Columbia
Council should it decide to amend the URESA statute, could state that the last two choices
of law under D.C. CODE § 30-304 (1973) must always apply in Neal, Hall, and Goodwin
situations.
124. If the laws of the obligee's forum are more favorable to the obligee than the laws of
the obligor's forum, the court would apply a good faith test to see whether the obligee moved
there solely to obtain greater benefits. Ehrenzweig, supra note 122.
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cause of its fundamental fairness, is more desirable than that of Hall and
would reflect favorably on the application of URESA in the District.
IV. SUPPORT ARREARAGES: NON-RECOVERABLE UNDER THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA URESA
A second troublesome aspect of the District of Columbia URESA con-
cerns arrearages. Arrearages are the accumulated amounts of support that
become overdue when an obligor ceases making support payments. Al-
though the District's URESA statute does not contain provisions specifi-
cally authorizing the collection of arrearages, District of Columbia courts
have nonetheless ordered payment of arrearages under URESA and have
collected and disbursed such payments. For example, in Howze v.
Howze, 125 the appellee, a Michigan resident, sued her ex-husband, a Dis-
trict resident, for child support arrearages that accumulated under a Mich-
igan divorce decree. The Domestic Relations Branch of the District of
Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals entered a money judgment for over
two thousand dollars in arrearages and ordered continuing support, pursu-
ant to appellee's URESA petition. The appellant then challenged a con-
comitant District of Columbia court order extending support payments
through his daughter's eighteenth birthday and asked for a refund of any
overpayments he might have made. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals denied his motion and ordered any overpayments to be applied to
the outstanding arrearages.126
Similarly, in Barnett v. Barnett, 27 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals permitted a ten dollar reduction of appellant obligor's monthly
URESA support payments on a showing of changed financial circum-
stances but ordered him nonetheless to pay an additional five dollars each
month to discharge accumulated arrearages. 128 No underlying authority,
either statutory or common law, is cited in Barnett as support for ordering
payment of arrearages.
Recently, however, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that
arrearages cannot be recovered under the District of Columbia URESA
statute. In Schlecht v. Schlecht, 29 the parties were divorced in Colorado
in August, 1971, and the wife obtained custody of the children. In Decem-
ber, 1971, alimony was awarded in a separate decree, a valid procedure
125. 225 A.2d 477 (D.C. 1967).
126. Id. at 479.
127. 243 A.2d 51 (D.C. 1968).
128. Id at 52.
129. 387 A.2d 575 (D.C. 1978).
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under Colorado law.' 3° The parties moved separately to Maryland, where
the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County adopted the Colorado ali-
mony decree. The husband then moved to the District of Columbia and
ceased making support payments. In October of 1974, the wife filed a
URESA petition in Maryland, alleging that her former husband had not
paid support for over ten months and was consequently five thousand dol-
lars in arrears. The Maryland URESA petition was transmitted to the
District of Columbia Superior Court where the court determined it had no
jurisdiction to act on the Maryland decree.
The basis for the trial court's decision was threefold. First, it cited as
authority Gamble v. Gamble,13 ' a case that precluded granting full faith
and credit to modifiable support orders entered outside the District. Sec-
ond, the trial court noted that the Colorado support order was entered
some four months after the divorce was granted. Without acknowledging
the validity of this procedure in Colorado, the District of Columbia court
ruled the support order invalid. Under the court's reasoning, the Mary-
land court had merely adopted an invalid Colorado decree that was ac-
cordingly outside the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia court. Third,
the trial court ruled that the District of Columbia had no power to order
payment of arrearages under URESA.
The court of appeals disagreed with two of the trial court's rationales. It
held that, since Gamble did not preclude enforcement of the Maryland
order,' 32 and since the Colorado decree was validly entered under Colo-
rado law, and therefore valid as adopted in Maryland, the District of Co-
lumbia court had jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court ordered the obligor
to make support payments commencing from the date the URESA petition
was filed in Maryland. The court of appeals agreed, however, that the
District of Columbia URESA does not permit recovery of arrearages.
133
130. Id. at 578.
131. 258 A.2d 261 (D.C. 1969). In Gamble, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held a Maryland alimony and child support decree not entitled to full faith and credit since
it was subject to retroactive modification or cancellation. The Gamble decision comports
with Sisiare, supra note 11 (past due judgments in a state are not entitled to full faith and
credit if modifiable), but is a non-URESA decision, which the Schlecht trial court did not
take into account.
132. 387 A.2d at 578.
133. Since 10 months had elapsed between cessation of the support payments and the
filing of the URESA petition, an aggregate of $5,000 in arrearages had accumulated, none of
which was recoverable. Id The court commented:
As to arrearages in the husband's alimony and child support payments at the
time the wife filed her URESA petition, we note that the 1968 Model Act for
URESA expressly provides that a duty of support "includes the duty to pay arrear-
ages." The District of Columbia has never adopted this 1968 revision, however,
1980]
Catholic University Law Review
Judge Stanley S. Harris, dissenting in part, criticized the court's arrearages
decision on three grounds, calling it inconsistent with the statutory scheme
of URESA, beneficial to a defaulting obligor, and likely to encourage
otherwise avoidable litigation.' 34
The Schlecht opinion is at odds with the basic motives behind the
URESA statute and has unnecessarily curbed judicial enforcement of sup-
port orders in the District of Columbia. Arrearages could have been held
recoverable by the Schlecht court under several theories.
When the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the
first URESA statute in 1950, they intended that obligors be liable for any
accumulated and unpaid support fees and that such sums be recoverable
under the Act.' 35 The Commissioners relied on broad language in the
URESA statute to provide a basis for recovery of arrearages, particularly
the phrases "any duty of support"'136 and "all duties of support"'' 37 as they
appeared in the definitional sections and the enforcement sections of the
and we find nothing in this jurisdiction's definition of the "duty of support" en-
compassing arrearages. Accordingly, we are unable to extend the reach URESA
until the legislature takes action.
Id at 578-79.
134. Id. at 581.
135. The Prefatory Notes to the 1950 and 1952 URESA acts do not contain any express
reference to recovery of arrearages in URESA proceedings. See HANDBOOK (1952), supra
note 4, at 291-95; HANDBOOK (1950), supra note 2, at 171. Courts construing URESA stat-
utes based on the 1950 and 1952 drafts would consequently find no guidance as to recover-
ability of accrued support deficits. As a result, many courts that construed URESA refused
to order payment of arrearages. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCE-
MENT OF SUPPORT ACT 4 (1958) (cited in Kelso, Recirocal Enforcement of Support 1958
Dimensions, 43 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1959)).
136. The 1950 URESA provided that a duty of support included "any duty of support
imposed or imposable by law, or by court order, decree or judgment, whether interlocu-
latory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial [legal] separation,
separate maintenance or otherwise." URESA § 2(6) 1950, reprinted in HANDBOOK (1950),
supra note 2, at 175. The phrase any duty of support was intended to provide the basis for
courts to award payments for arrearages. See REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE URESA,
supra note 135.
137. URESA § 9 (1950), reprinted in HANDBOOK (1950), supra note 2, at 177, stated: "All
duties of support are enforceable by action . . . irrespective of the relationship between the
obligor and the obligee." One of the Act's drafters, William J. Brockelbank, has indicated
that section nine was intended to provide for recovery of arrearages, emphasizing the impor-
tance of the word all.
[Section nine] was included. . . with emphasis on the word "all" to provide that
all duties shall be enforceable regardless of their source. This was intended to
include all common law duties of support and all statutory duties of support, duties
growing out of judgments or decrees for alimony or child support, both as to
amounts in arrears and as to amounts owed currently or in the future. . . . The
broad coverage of these provisions has been explained at every meeting of the In-
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1950 and 1952 URESA. Nonetheless, courts construing URESA, although
committed to broad and liberal interpretation of the statute, 13 were, like
the Schlecht court, reticent to permit recovery of arrearages under the
Act. 139 Consequently, the Commissioners added section nine to the 1958
model act, explicitly providing for recoupment of arrearages 140 and reas-
serting their intent that arrearages be recoverable even under the earlier
drafts.' 41 The Schlecht court, however, interpreted the addition of explicit
terstate Conference on Reciprocal Support; and in its news letter and reports, the
Council of State Governments has been diligent in urging it.
Despite this fact, there has been a tendency to use the Act only for the recovery
of current support. Lawyers wanting to collect back alimony for their clients have
been missing the boat.
W. BROCKELBANK & F. INFAUSTO, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT 38-39
(2d ed. 1971). The District of Columbia URESA's corresponding section is not, however,
worded exactly the same: "Proceedings to enforce duties of support initiated by the District
of Columbia shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint irrespective of the relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant." D.C. CODE § 30-306 (1973). Although the word "all"
is not present in § 30-306, the District of Columbia URESA nonetheless shares the broad
definition of duty of support with the model act, consistent with its drafters' intent that
arrearages be recoverable.
138. The Commissioners' faith in the broad construction of the URESA was not entirely
unfounded; many courts have recognized the necessity to broadly construe the statute.
Kline v. Kline, 542 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Ark. 1976) (URESA should be liberally construed);
Banks v. McMorris, 47 Cal. App. 3d 723, 728, 121 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189 (1975) (URESA is a
remedial statute to be liberally construed); Olson v. Olson, 534 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App.
1976) (resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the URESA statute); Daly v. Daly, 21 N.J.
599, 123 A.2d 3, 6 (1956) (effort to render URESA operable consistent with intent of the
legislation should be made); Yetter v. Commeau, 84 Wash. 2d 155, 524 P.2d 901, 903 (1974)
(humanitarian purposes of the act should be considered when interpreting URESA). The
Schlecht court also noted approvingly that URESA's purpose is to permit expeditious inter-
state enforcement of support orders, with a minimum of expense. 387 A.2d at 577 n.8 (quot-
ing Watson v. Dreadin, 309 A.2d at 496).
139. By 1958, it was becoming a concern of the Commissioners that arrearages were not
being included in URESA support awards: "[E]xperience has shown that many courts have
interpreted the act to include only actions for current support. This has been true despite
constant efforts of the Council of State Governments and the chairman of your committee to
call attention to the broad definition of Section 2(f)." REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON
URESA, supra note 135, at 4.
140. Section 9 the amended 1958 URESA reads as follows: "All duties of support, in-
cluding arrearages, are enforcible [sic] by action irrespective of the relationship between the
obligor and the obligee." URESA (1958), supra note 14.
141. The Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the 1958 Act indicates, "Section 9 makes
clear that under the act not only current support, but also arrearages may be recovered."
HANDBOOK (1958), supra note 14, at 241. By 1968, the Commissioners had finally included
recovery of arrearages in the definition of duty of support. Section 2(b) reads: "'Duty of
Support' means a duty of support whether imposed or imposable by law or by order, decree,
or judgment of any court, whether interlocutory or final or whether incidental to any action
for divorce, separate maintenance, or otherwise and includes the duty to pay arrearages of
support past due and unpaid." RURESA § 2(b) (1968), supra note 14.
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language authorizing recovery of arrearages under URESA as the inclu-
sion of a new statutory feature instead of clarification of a procedure the
drafters intended to be available from the statute's inception.' 42 In the
absence of such explicit authorization, the court concluded it was power-
less to grant relief for the recovery of arrearages.143 In so concluding, the
Schlecht court overlooked prior District of Columbia law in which courts
had held arrearages recoverable and had issued orders to that effect.
In Howze v. Howze14 4 and Barnett v. Barnett,145 arrearages had been the
object of URESA orders in the District of Columbia. Both cases could
have provided the basis for judicial recognition by the Schlecht court that
arrearages are recoverable under the District of Columbia Act. The
Schlect court, however, ignored both Howze and Barnett in reaching its
decision because it felt that expansion of the URESA statute was a legisla-
tive task. 146 In view of the stated intent of the National Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws that arrearages be recoverable under the broadly de-
fined duty of support provision, 147 the Schlecht court would not have been
legislating had it recognized the authority to enforce payment of arrear-
ages under URESA, despite the lack of specific authorizing language in
the statute itself. 4 8
Moreover, interpretations from other jurisdictions support the view that
arrearages are recoverable without specific language to that effect in the
statute. For example, in Coumans v. Albaugh, 149 the New Jersey Superior
Court considered a URESA suit brought against a New Jersey resident by
his former wife, a Michigan resident. At issue was a substantial amount of
accumulated arrearages and present child support that had been ordered
by Missouri courts pursuant to a divorce decree entered in that state. The
New Jersey court declined to order arrearages because no showing had
been made that the order was not modifiable under Missouri law.'
50
142. See notes 136 & 137 supra.
143. See note 119 supra.
144. 225 A.2d 477 (D.C. 1967).
145. 243 A.2d 51 (D.C. 1968).
146. Howze is mentioned by the majority as an example of an alternative remedy, a
money judgment, for collecting arrearages. The fact that the money judgment in Howze was
awarded in a URESA proceeding is not mentioned. Id. at 577 n.7. Barnell is not discussed
at all.
147. See notes 136 & 137 supra.
148. Judge Harris considered the absence of specific statutory authorization to be no bar
to recovery of arrearages. Schlech, 387 A.2d at 581 (Harris, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
149. 36 N.J. Super. 308, 115 A.2d 641 (1955).
150. The New Jersey court indicated that if the order were subject to modification or
revocation in Missouri, "it should not be enforced here either under the full faith and credit
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Nonetheless, the court concluded that if the order were final' 5 ' and the
Missouri court fixed and determined arrearages, New Jersey would take
appropriate action and order payment.' 52 The Coumans decision is partic-
ularly relevant because it was made under the 1952 amended URESA, the
version most similar to that adopted by the District of Columbia,'53 and
because the court would have permitted the recovery of arrearages without
explicit authorizing language in the statute.
5 4
Furthermore, the Schlecht court could have relied on its traditional eq-
uitable powers to enforce an order for arrearages under URESA. Al-
though courts in many jurisdictions will not apply such equitable remedies
in proceedings to enforce foreign support orders,'55 the 1950 and later ver-
clause, or, as a matter of comity." Id. at 313, 115 A.2d at 643. This view is consistent with
several U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 80 (1944) (non-
modifiable arrearages award entitled to full faith and credit); Sistare v, Sistare, 218 U.S. i,
11-18 (1909) (modifiable past due judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit). See
also Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1919) (past alimony award entitled to full faith and
credit if not modifiable).
151. The Coumans court might have chosen to escape the Sistare ban on full and credit
for modifiable awards by invoking the doctrine of comity, whereby a court grants the
decison of a sister state the same force as its own:
Comity is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience and expediency. It
is something more than mere courtesy, which implies only deference to the opinion
of others, since it has a substantial value in securing uniformity of decison, and
discouraging litigation of the same question.
Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900). In the mid-1950's, comity
seemed to be resurging as a remedy in interstate support cases. Equitable enforcement,
based on comity and public policy, was used to counter the national problem of deserted
dependents. Comment, supra note 10, at 520 n.7. Comity would not be excluded in the
District under URESA and the court's equitable powers. D.C. CODE § 30-303 (1973) (any
other remedies may be applied in URESA proceedings).
152. 115 A.2d at 643. The New Jersey court indicated that another state's order would
usually dictate the extent of the support granted in New Jersey, citing principles of comity
and the basic purposes of URESA. Id. at 642.
153. The present New Jersey URESA contains explicit authorization for the recovery of
arrearages. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:4-30.1 to 2A:4-30.23 (1958).
154. An interesting variation on the arrearages question has developed under the Florida
URESA. The Florida act does not provide for recovery of arrearages when Florida acts as
the responding state. FLA. STAT. § 88.011 to 88.371 (1978). The general duties of Florida as
the initiating state, outlined in the statute, id § 88.141, are supplemented by Fla. Op. Att'y
Gen. 077-77 (1977), indicating that Florida, as the responding state, may order the recovery
of arrearages. Accordingly, Florida courts have permitted recovery of arrearages under the
Act when the amount of accumulated arrearages is not subject to modification. See
Courtney v. Warner, 290 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (judgment for arrearages
may be recovered under URESA, unless law of state where decree issued is modifiable as to
accrued installments); Villano v. Harper, 248 So. 2d 205, 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)
(Florida indulges in rebuttable presumption that courts of sister states have no authority to
alter final decrees as to any past due installments for child support).
155. See Kelso, supra note 135, at 878 & n.27 (1959) (many decisions do not permit the
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sions of URESA do permit the use of equitable remedies to enforce sup-
port obligations. 56 In McCabe v. McCabe, 57 the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that Maryland courts could use their equitable powers to
enforce a Nevada alimony decree as to both accrued alimony and accru-
able alimony, and could use the same equitable powers to enforce a for-
eign decree as they would use to enforce a Maryland decree.' 58 The
Schlecht court could have enforced recovery of arrearages by exercising its
equitable powers or by simply recognizing the doctrine of comity, even
though the District of Columbia URESA is silent on arrearages., 59
Additionally, the majority opinion in Schlecht is internally inconsistent
on the question of arrearages since it does permit recovery of sums ac-
cumulating after the URESA petition has been filed.' 6 ° The court does
not explain why filing the claim causes only subsequent payments to be-
come collectible. The practical effect of this aspect of the decision will be
to encourage nonpayment and to increase litigation. For example, an obli-
use of equitable remedies for enforcement of sister state decrees and will not locally establish
such decrees to be thereafter enforced as local judgments). The state of Florida will permit
the use of equitable powers by the court for the recovery of prospective payments. Sackler v.
Sackler, 47 So. 2d 292, 295 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (under principles of comity and public
policy, future installments of support are enforceable by equitable remedies). It would ap-
pear that Florida courts should have the power in equity to enforce recovery of arrearages,
since Florida recognizes as a rebuttable presumption that sister states may not modify final
decrees as to past due support and that such decrees should be entitled to full faith and
credit. See Villano v. Harper, 248 So. 2d at 206; Boyer v. Andrews, 143 Fla. 42, 196 So. 825,
829 (1940).
156. Compare URESA § 26 (1958) (court has the power when acting as responding juris-
diction to subject obligor to such items and conditions as the court may deem proper to
assure compliance with orders) with D.C. CODE § 30-315 (1973) (pursuant to finding sup-
port, the court may order defendant to pay such amounts under terms and conditions the
court deems proper). See also Kelso, supra note 135, at 880 (1950 URESA and its successors
correct procedural gap by permitting use of equitable remedies).
157. 210 Md. 308, 123 A.2d 447 (1956).
158. "[I]f the wife in this case [were] ... residing in another state and proceeding under
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act against her husband who was in this
State, the husband could be made to obey orders to support by sanctions available to eq-
uity." 210 Md. at 315, 123 A.2d at 451. See also Abb v. Crossfield, 23 Md. App. 232, 237,
326 A.2d 234, 238 (1974) (court in URESA action has at its disposal whatever equitable
powers are necessary to effectuate the Act); Pennsylvania ex rel. Warren v. Warren, 204 Md.
467, 472, 105 A.2d 488, 490 (1954) (court held in URESA action that support and mainte-
nance of dependents in civil action is cognizable in equity).
159. An interesting argument could be made for the recovery of arrearages if the District
of Columbia URESA had the provision for registration of foreign support orders. Under
the registration system, the responding state may treat foreign support orders as if originally
entered in the responding state. The arrearages would then be a debt under the responding
state's law, and it would also have personal jurisdiction over the obligor. See Kelso, supra
note 135, at 883.
160. Schlecht, 387 A.2d at 578.
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gor in the District of Columbia may now default on support payments,
knowing that any sums accumulating before the obligee decides to file a
URESA petition will not be enforceable in the URESA proceeding.
Consequently, a non-District obligee will be well advised to file a
URESA petition as soon as any payment is overdue from a District-resi-
dent obligor in order to minimize the amount of arrearages that are uncol-
lectible under the Schlecht ruling. The alternative for the obligee is not
promising and may involve a non-URESA foreign money judgment at
home, plus a trip to the District to have it enforced.' 6 ' A further repercus-
sion may be that judges will accommodate Schlecht by increasing the
amount they award for present and prospective support to compensate ob-
ligees for accumulated arrearages they have been unable to collect under
the District of Columbia URESA.
V. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act in the District of
Columbia was adopted to permit efficient collection of interstate support
payments from defaulting obligors. Enacted over twenty years ago to shed
the District's reputation as a "haven for runaway fathers,"' 62 the District
of Columbia URESA has not accomplished its stated purpose. Two major
deficiencies demand immediate action. Additionally, an updating of the
Act to include improvements made in the amended model acts would
greatly enhance the operation of URESA in the District. First, in view of
the Sch/echt decision that prevents the collection of arrearages in URESA
proceedings, the District of Columbia Council should adopt specific lan-
guage to make clear that the duty to pay arrearages is a duty of support.
The amended model act provides such language. The District of Colum-
bia should not allow obligors within its jurisdiction to escape legitimate
support obligations by using the current URESA statute as the vehicle of
their avoidance. Second, since District of Columbia courts have adopted
divergent approaches to the choice of law to be made under URESA, the
District of Columbia Council or the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals should clearly delineate what substantive law applies to matters such
as the age of majority of a minor receiving support. Arbitrary enforcement
of the duty of support according to the District's support law reflects
poorly on the District and on its courts, and it permits inequitable awards
161. Judge Harris outlined a possible result in which the obligee would be required to
"flit" from another forum to the District to enforce a foreign money judgment. Id at 581
n.5 (Harris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Such a result is contrary to the
basic concept of URESA that an obligee not be required to leave his home state.
162. S. REP. No. 462, supra note 5, at 3.
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and possible manipulation of the URESA process. To permit the most
equitable choice of law when an obligee's age of majority is in question
and to alleviate the present confusion, District of Columbia Courts should
apply a home forum test, limiting support duties to those recognized in the
initiating state.
Finally, the District should enact the other improvements of URESA
1958 and URESA 1968, further facilitating the process of support collec-
tion in the District of Columbia. Persons owed a duty of support in the
District would benefit from the adoption of a registration system to sim-
plify and expedite enforcement of support obligations. Furthermore, the
District itself would benefit from a registration system since URESA en-
forcement would become less of a financial burden.
Although the District of Columbia URESA has provided some assist-
ance to persons seeking to enforce support duties across state lines, its defi-
ciencies now threaten to frustrate the basic purposes of the Act. The
URESA statute in the District of Columbia has become an inadequate
mechanism for efficient enforcement of duties of support. Accordingly, the
District of Columbia Council should amend the law to comport with both
fundamental fairness and the purposes that URESA was intended to serve.
Christopher Bellotto
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